Wendy Ford
- July 17th, 2017
In Memoriam
(from a Journal article in PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2, June 1997)
On September 1, 1996 Patrick J. Fett died after a long battle with cancer. Pat was recently promoted to Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Memphis. His untimely death at the age of 37 robbed the profession of one if its most promising young scholars. More importantly, it robbed us of one of the most genuinely good-hearted people to touch the lives of those lucky enough to have known him.
Pat grew up in Iowa City, Iowa, the son of a public school teacher. He earned his baccalaureate degree from the University of Iowa and his Ph.D. from the University of Rochester. He held faculty positions at Vanderbilt University (1988-1993) and the University of Memphis (1993-1996).
During his all-too-brief career Pat produced some extraordinary scholarship that demonstrated his eye for the enduring questions in politics and his commitment to rigorous scientific method. His ability to combine formal theory with empirical methods resulted in a body of works that have enhanced significantly our understanding of how institutional feature of the U.S. Congress (its rules and structure) affect its operations and its interactions with the executive branch. During Pat’s tenure review, Richard F. Fenno, Kenan Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester and one of the discipline’s best known scholars on Congress, characterized Pat’s work as follows:
His body of research on presidential legislative priorities is, to my mind, the best political science work on that subject. It makes a substantial contribution to the study of presidential leadership generally. And it pioneers, first in the use of presidential messages as indicators of presidential priorities and, second, in the use of individual notes to measure legislator response and – in addition to cumulative support scores – to analyze executive-legislative relations.
Two of his articles developed our understanding of the way in which national agendas emerge from the interplay between Congress and the president. “Presidential Legislative Priorities and Legislators’ Voting Decisions: An Exploratory Analysis” (
Journal of Politics, 1994) and “Truth in Advertising: The Revelation of Presidential Legislative Priorities” (
Western Political Quarterly, 1992) are theoretically sophisticated empirically grounded works that go beyond anecdote to offer test of how presidential communication styles affect the voting behavior of legislators. The latter work is cited in virtually every current article on presidential-congressional relations.
In “A Content Based Analysis of Personal Presidential Lobbying of Congress” (Southern Political Review, 1993), Pat broadened his focus to examine the persuasiveness of presidents with Congress, not through speech-making but through the direct appeals to individual legislators by the president and his congressional liaison staff. Using specific policy battles to anchor the analysis, Pat compares presidential success in the House and Senate. His research design for this study was clever, innovative, and appropriate to the question. As in his other works, Pat advanced our understanding of executive-legislative interactions by developing an innovative research design that allowed him to explain the behavior of actors in the executive branch and both houses of Congress in their interaction over specific policy matters. His analysis corroborates the limited extent of the president’s influence over legislative outcomes and the importance of political context in determining the extent and form of that influence when it does occur. His analysis is especially powerful in its ability to test for general patterns in political behavior and to recommend new avenues of research on legislative-executive interaction.
The agility of his intellect was demonstrated in tow additional articles on the term limits movement, in which he brought to bear suitable social scientific methods to the analysis of an issue that is currently prominent in the public arena. “Congressional Term Limits, State Legislative Term Lmits and Congressional Turnover: a Theory of Change” (with Daniel Ponder in
PS: Polictical Science and Politics, 1993) was exceptional for its exposition of some likely outcomes of term limit legislation, outcomes that were largely ignored in the public debate surrounding the issue. Specifically, term limits on state legislatures will alter the make-up of the U.S. Congress by altering the pool of candidates for seats in the U.S. Congress. State legislators who reach the term limimt in the state legislature will run for the U.S. Congress by altering the pool of cadates for seats in the U.S,Congress. State legislators who reach the term limit in the state legislaturewill run for the US Congress rather than retire from public life. “The Implications of Turnover and Term Limits on Institutional Stability” (with Scott Ainsworth and Itai Sened) received the Pi Sigma Alpha Award for the best paper presented at the 1995 Midwest Political Science Association convention. It combined formal theoretic analysis and statistical tests to estimate the liekly effects of term limits on the instability of legislative institutions. By se this combination of approachs, Pat and his co-authors speak to two audiences that are often artifically seprared by their distinctive methodogoies. Richard Fenno praises it both for its use of formal, rational choide analysis of institutions and for “push[ing] that somewhat abstract literetare in the direction of some hard-headed empirical analysis of important, real world problems. That…is a very large contribution, and it is…Pat’s great talendt as a political scientist. It is a telent much to be valude, in my judgment, and much to be husbanded in our discipline.”